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SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS 
This paper addresses the problem of estimating the 
reliability of a critical system function as well as its impact on 
the system reliability when limited infonnation is available. 
The approach addresses the basic function reliability, and then 
the impact of multiple attempts to accomplish the function. 
The dependence of subsequent attempts on prior failure to 
accomplish the function is also addressed. The autonomous 
docking of two spacecraft was the specific example that 
generated the inquiry, and the resultant impact on total 
reliability generated substantial interest in presenting the 
results due to the relative insensitivity of overall performance 
to basic function reliability and moderate degradation given 
sufficient attempts to try and accomplish the required goal. 
The app lication of the methodology allows proper emphasis 
on the characte ristics that can be estimated with some 
knowledge, and to insulate the integrity of the design from 
those characte ri stics that can't be properly estimated with any 
rational value of uncertainty. The nature of NASA's missions 
contains a great deal of uncertainty due to the pursuit of new 
science or operations. This approach can be applied to any 
function where multiple attempts at success, with or without 
degradation, are allowed. 
I INTRODUCTION 
The NASA Goddard Space Flight Center has established 
the Integrated Design Center (IDC) to assist project teams, 
who are the customers of the IDC, with establishing key 
design parameters for proposed new space flight missions. A 
description of two of the labs in the IDC was presented in (1). 
A third lab, the Architecture Design Lab (ADL) has been 
added to the IDC. The ADL 's function is to evaluate various 
options to accomplish a mission and then down select to a few 
that are feasible within the mission requirements and available 
resources and schedule. A key part of this process is 
determining the probability of mission success (Reliability). 
The results of these studies are used to prepare proposals for 
NASA Headquarters to approve the development and launch 
of the spacecraft and instruments. 
2 ACRONYMS 
ADL Architecture Design Lab 
HST Hubble Space Telescope 
IDC Integrated Design Center 
I&T Integration and Test 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
3 ARCHITEC TURE DEVELOPMENT LABORATORY 
The ADL is a logical outgrowth of the lDC's Mission and 
Instrument Design Labs. The purpose of the ADL is to 
evaluate a number of potential solutions to accomplish a 
mission, winnow these down to a manageable set of 
alternatives, then evaluate the alternatives to determine which 
are the most suitable to accomplish the mission. The 
evaluation addresses all of the key parameters to accomplish 
the mission including mass, cost, schedule, technological risks 
(abil ity to design and build the hardware required and operate 
in space) and reliability. Ideally, one or two of the evaluated 
configurations would then be subject to a more detailed 
modeling in the Mission Design Lab for Spacecraft and 
Mission Operations, and the lnstrument Design Lab if any 
specialized instruments had to be developed as well. The ADL 
Operational Methodology is the following: 
• Generate a Trade Tree that covers the complete study 
trade space 
• List every possibly reasonable and conceivably viable 
option; examine and leveragc off of previous studies on 
the subject; explore all available applicable material, 
known solutions, general knowledge. Do not reinvent the 
wheel! Conduct brainstorming sessions, add all creative 
and novel solutions as practical. 
• Explore the Trade Space 
- Examine, evaluate, and disposition, every option on the 
Trade Tree one by one without exception; categorize and 
document the disposition rationale for every option 
• Category 1 Options: These options are confirmed 
realistic, feasib le and viable; will be taken through the 
complete evaluation process, and placed on the Final 
Comparison Charts; conduct in~depth engineering and 
programmatic analyses, as applicable, and generate 
parametric sizing / design; Generate Ps numbers; 
generate Mission Lifecycle Cost in a uniform manner. 
• Category 2 Options: Considered as potentially feasible 
until more in-depth calculations or analyses prove 
otherwise 
- Conduct assessments and some analyses as required to 
disposition these; one possible outcome is the 
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promotion to Category 1; Disposition rationale is 
typically added as an Appendix to the Trade Tree . 
• Catego ry 3 Options: Obviously unattractive, unfeasible. 
or absurd 
- Expert judgment and/or engineering assessment is 
sufficient to disposition these. Unanimous study team 
plus customer lead concurrence is required; a note with 
disposition rationale is added to the Trade Tree. 
• Compile Summa ry Cha rts 
4 mE MISSION - DOCKING WITH AND DISPOSING OF 
THE HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPEAT END OF LIFE 
To develop the necessary mission scenarios to be 
evaluated, the ADL Operat ional Methodology was applied. A 
trade tree of 5 mission elements was created: HST operational 
state, disposal location, capture method, disposal method, 
main propulsion system. 27 architectures were cons idered and 
disposi tioned with the 3 category rationale. After mapping the 
trade tree, 9 Category I architectures + uncontro lled re-entry 
were developed and assessed for risk and cost. 
The ADL derived assumptions for Architecture Options 
were: 
• HST's natural orbit degradation will cause its uncontrolled 
reentry not earlier than - 2025 
• Action is required when HST reaches 500 km alt itude; 
uncontrolled reentry predicted 6 to 24 months later 
• HST Disposal is the primary mission 
The considered architectures are for HST disposal via 
• Controlled reentry into Pacific Ocean 
• Boost to 1200 km disposal orbit 
• Boost to 2000 km disposal orbit (in accordance with 
international agreement) 
The Baseline Docking hardware would be the HST Soft 
Capture Mechanism (SCM) 
• Based on the ISS Low Impact Docking System (LIDS) for 
all architectures 
• Active side never designed; requires customized, flight 
design/development/hardware for HST-LiDS 
• Assume autonomous rendezvous and docking package 
proposed for another mission 
To summarize, the proposed mission investigated in the 
ADL was to dispose of the Hubble Space Telescope (HST) at 
the end of its life in the next decade by plunging it into the 
ocean by controlled reentry; lifting it to a significantly higher 
orbit; 01' extending HST's mission by 10 years before plunging 
in the ocean or lifting to a higher orbit. Without any action, 
the HST's orbit would decay and result in an uncontrolled 
reentry with associated possibili ty of human injury. This 
disposal mission involves launching a disposal module that 
has to rendezvous with the HST, dock to a ring that was 
attached during one of the HST repair missions, and either li ft 
HST to a higher orbit for disposal, lift HST to a higher orbit 
fo r conti nued operations, or plunge HST into the ocean. 
5 THE PROBLEM - DETERMINING THE PROBABILITY 
OF A SUCCESSFUL DOCKING MAII'EUVER 
In evaluating the HST Disposal Mission Reliability four 
phases were identified for the mission - Launch; Rendezvous 
with HST; Dock with HST; Disposal of HST. The key factor 
was determined to be the re liability of successfully docking 
with the HST. This was go ing to be an autonomous action, 
and differentiating from the other stages, there was also very 
little data available to use fol' determination of the probability 
of successful docking. There was anecdotal information that 
various team members estimated as "very likely" to "difficult" 
to accomplish (read as 90+% to 50% probability of success). 
This limited information with substantial uncertainty created a 
problem that had to be resolved. The only known factor was 
that there was sufficient fuel for four attempts at docking. 
The short duration of the disposal mission (- 2 weeks) 
produced a very high re liability for the spacecraft hardware 
and further emphasized the sensitivity of the mission to the 
docking reliability. 
6 ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM 
The essence of the problem is that the rel iabil ity of the 
docking process is unknown - it cannot be modeled until 
actual detailed system design (hardware, software, and 
process) has been developed and a predicted estimate was 
required so that a proposal could be prepared for approval by 
NASA Headquarters. 
Although the reliability of the hardware could be 
estimated, the reliability of the software including the 
algorithms and the interface of sensor data with processing 
functions and the actuators and mechanisms required for 
docking could not be predicted with any reasonable range of 
accuracy. In fact, if the fa ilure of the software is in the 
interface where the software controls the docking hardware. a 
fi rst docking attempt fai lure due to this fa ilure would preclude 
any subsequent successfu l docking attempt. The specifi c 
process selected to be enacted with the hardware and software 
will impact the docking reliability through sequenci ng of 
functions that accomplish the docking maneuver. 
Addi tionally, the dependence of subsequent docking attempts 
on the failure of prior attempts was unknown. Some misses 
where damage is done to the docking mechanisms might 
greatly reduce the reliability of or preclude the ability to 
successfully dock on a subsequent attempt. The earl y stage of 
the design at this point precludes a usable reliability est imation 
of the docking hardware and software, let alone a trade space 
to evaluate alternative approaches. Instead of predicting a 
reliability value, the necessary in itial reliabi lity and freedom 
from dependence had to be determined. This information 
would set requirements for accomplishing the docking and 
provide some assurance that the methods chosen would 
comply with the requirements. 
The problem becomes a set of possibil ities (expressed as 
probabi li ty of success per attempt) fol' init ial probability of 
docking success and a second set of possibil ities for 
dependence of subsequent docking attempts on prior attempts 
(expressed as degradation of probability of success of 
subsequent attempts). This approach contains the problem, 
and in the analysis will provide a range of possible solutions to 
the problem. It should be noted that all of the learning of the 
docking process has to be developed prior to launch since the 
docking occurs within onc wcek of launch. A significant part 
of the learn ing necessary to design the hardware, software and 
docking methodology would result from the simulation of the 
process. This would include computer simulations, 
mechanical model simulations, and possibly ground based 
simulation using an exact replica of the docking mechan ism 
and control system. 
7 RECOMMENDED APPROACH 
Even with a successfu l launch and deployment, and no 
hardware failures, a failure of the docking maneuver would 
cause the Mission to fai l. The approach taken was to develop 
a matrix of possible docking reliabilities based on the initial 
docking reliabi lity and adjusted for dependence of subsequent 
docking attempts. A defined constraint of the mission at th is 
design stage was that the design was being calculated and 
implemented with sufficient fuel for a maximum of four 
docking attempts. The initial estimate assumed the reliability 
Docking 
for each docking attempt would be 90% and each attempt 
would be independent of any other attempt yielding a 99.99% 
probability of docking success for the maximum of 4 attempts. 
This assumption is dependent on addressing all risks before 
commitment to a design, detailed simulation of the docking 
maneuver and thorough Integration and Test (I&T) to address 
potential infant mortality. Impact docking reliability induced 
an assessment for a range of initial reliabilities down to 70%, 
and degradations as high as 50% for each subsequent attempt. 
A table detai ling the results for 90%, 80%, and 70% 
Docking attempt Reliability with no residual dependency as 
well as residual dependencies up to 50% is provided in Table 
I. If the probability of docking success (Total Docking 
Reliability) falls below 99%, docking becomes the key driver 
for Mission Reliability and Risk of Human Casualty. A 
probability for Total Docking Reliability under 95% was 
considered to be unacceptable. 
The Total Docking Reliabi lity is a simple calculation of I 
- the product of the failure probabilities (1- Reliabil ity) of the 
four attempts: 
Mempt 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 0_8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 
Reliability 
Probability of 
Zero 1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 
Residual 
Dependence 
Reliability of 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 
stAttempt 
Re liabi lity of 0.9 0.81 0.72 0.63 0.54 0.45 0.8 0.72 0.64 0.56 0.48 0.4 0.7 0.63 0.56 0.49 0.42 0.35 2nd Attempt 
Reliabi lity of 0.9 0.73 0.58 0.44 0.32 0.23 0.8 0.65 0.51 0.39 0.29 0.2 0.7 0.57 0.45 0.34 0.25 0. 18 3rd Attempt 
Reliability of 0.9 0.66 0.46 p.30> 0.19 0.11 0.8 0.58 0.41 0.27 0.17 0.1 0.7 0.51 0.36 0.24 0.15 0.08E 
'l:th Attempt 
otal 
Docking 0.9999 D.99E P994 p.98E .97 0.962 P99E .992 0.98 0.96 0.94 0.91 0.992 0.98 0.95 0.92 0.89 0.85 
Reliability 
Table I Determ ination of Docking Reliability 
Developing an understanding of how variation in these 
assumptions would impact the Total Docking Reliability 
generated the need fo r this table. Using the table, it is 
apparent that if the Reliability of the initial docking attempt is 
even as poor as 0.7, an acceptable docking reliability can be 
achieved with modest degradation (less than 10% degradation) 
of subsequent attempts. I f the degradation is expected to be 
larger, then a higher initial reliability will he required. It is 
interesting to note that a high initial reliability, even with 
serious degradation of 50% per attempt, still yields a Total 
Docking Reliability over 0.96. On the other hand, even 
though an initial reliability of 0.7 will yield a Total Docking 
Reliability of 0.992 with no degradation, moderate 
degradation of 20% gives a Total Docking Reliabi lity of 0.95 
which is for all intents and purposes unacceptable since it 
produces a calculation with an unacceptable probability for 
possible human injury upon reentry into the atmosphere. To 
clearly present this information for all the possibi li ties, a color 
coded matrix was developed and is shown in Figure 1. As can 
be seen in the figure , the absolute limits for a fully acceptable 
docking reliability is >0.7 for initial probability of successful 
docking, and 20% (1-0.8) for residual dependency on 
subsequent attempts. Agai n note that both of these limits 
could not happen on the same design, or an unacceptable 
result would occur. Considering the type of mission being 
considered and the lack of prior experience with this type of 
maneuver, the ability to estimate the likelihood of degradation 
with an acceptable degree of uncertainty is not very strong. It 
therefore becomes fairly obvious that our effort should be 
biased towards assuring as high a reliability as is practicable 
within cost constraints for the initial docking attempt, again 
with a reasonable level of uncertainty. 
Figure I - Color Coded Total Docking Reliability 
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